Uncertainty regarding a law's effects on fundamental rights
Judges are obligated to rule on the cases they hear; otherwise, justice is denied. When the facts of a case are certain, stable and unchanging, this obligation is less problematic than when judges face random, indefinite assumptions in evolving fields with little certainty. When change is at play, developments may well lead to a violation of fundamental rights. Judges are charged with the decision and cannot defer it indefinitely: relying on the benefit of doubt, can they simply ignore the uncertainty 1 This article is an adaptation and a translation of Alexandre FLÜCKIGER, 'L'obligation jurisprudentielle d'évaluation législative : une application du principe de précaution aux droits fondamentaux' in Andreas Auer, Alexandre Flückiger and Michel Hottelier (eds), Les droits de l'homme et la constitution : études en l'honneur du Professeur Giorgio Malinverni (Schulthess 2007) [155] [156] [157] [158] [159] [160] [161] [162] [163] [164] [165] [166] [167] [168] [169] [170] of a situation and allow the lawsuit to proceed? Or must they, by way of precaution, oppose it?
The precautionary principle-sometimes contested -has been precisely developed as a tool to act in such a situation. Contrary to common belief, the application of the precautionary principle does not necessarily lead to prohibitive measures. We will show indeed that imposing an obligation of monitoring and evaluating the impact of a legislation can be a stimulating third way between full authorization and plain interdiction.
As a matter of fact, faced with this dilemma in such areas as the safety of a new type of nuclear facility, the effects of cannabis use or the impact of new regulations on abortion, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has developed original case law as part of the constitutionality review of legislation by imposing an obligation of legislative monitoring and correction (Beobachtungspflicht, Korrektur-oder Nachbesserungspflicht) on the legislator when there is uncertainty regarding the law's effect on fundamental rights. In other words, the Constitutional Court forces the legislator to systematically gather the necessary data and use it to evaluate the effects of legislation and to correct that legislation based on the evaluation.
2 Rather than prohibiting the activity or the new legislative concept, the judge applies formal conditions.
Wondering if this case-law had spread to other legal systems, we couldn't easily find an answer in the literature. Further research would be needed. We therefore restricted our investigation in a system that we knew, the Swiss law. Although the examples were pretty hard to find, we were able to show that the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland has applied the same principle on occasion.
Finally, before concluding, we will specify the relationship to the precautionary principle and discuss how this can be applied to the review of legislation against fundamental rights.
2.
The obligation of legislative monitoring and correction: An obligation to evaluate the law
The obligation of legislative monitoring
The obligation of legislative monitoring essentially involves 'observing' legislation (Beobachtungspflicht) as executed and evaluating its effects.
3 More specifically, it is a matter of examining how the legislation is being implemented and the impacts stemming from it. Parliament's legislative responsibility now extends beyond the point at which a law is adopted and takes effect. 4 For as long as the law is in force, the legislator must gather the factual information necessary to evaluate how the text is affecting reality and identify any discrepancy with the original goals. Concretely, the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, Germany, asks that the uncertain impacts of legislation on fundamental rights be taken into account by requiring that relevant data be systematically collected and assessed so that its effects 5 can be determined as clearly as possible to allow for early detection of significant transformations. 6 The Court has sometimes given the legislator very specific indications on the type, the nature and the quality of the statistics to gather as part of the legislative monitoring obligation. In the ruling on termination of pregnancy, it asked that the exact number of abortions, the per capita abortion rate, the number of women of child-bearing age, and the number of pregnancies, foetal deaths, live births and legal abortions be established.
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According to doctrine, in order to fulfil its obligation of legislative monitoring, the legislator must use the methodology for retrospective legislative review and apply 3 CHOI (n 2) 69; Ulrich KARPEN, Gesetzgebungs-, Verwaltungs-und Rechtsprechungslehre (Nomos 1989) i.e., efficacy (is the legislation achieving its intended objectives?), effectiveness (is the legislation actually being followed?) and efficiency (is the legislation's cost/benefit ratio reasonable ?), in particular.
9
The legislator is granted a certain time period to collect the necessary data.
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Monitoring need not be continuous. The legislator must simply ensure, using an appropriate, periodic approach (e.g., regular government reports to Parliament), that the legislation is in fact delivering the expected outcomes or is not perpetuating conceptual flaws in its concrete implementation.
11 The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany thus allowed a period of ten years for gathering data on the efficacy of repayment measures for loans to farming co-operatives in the former German Democratic Republic (referred to as 'old debts').
12 At the end of the time period, the legislation will have to be examined to determine if the path chosen will eventually lead to the desired results. 13 If not, the Court grants an 'appropriate' time period. 14 2.2 The obligation to correct legislation When observation of a law's effects shows that its ends will not be met and will lead to unconstitutionality, the Court imposes an obligation to correct the ' (BVerfGE 37, 104, 118, Bonus-MalusRegelung, 3.04.1974) . The same formula is found in the judgment on the constitutionality of the numerus clausus in universities (BVerfGE 43, 291, 321) or life sentences for murder (BVerfGE 45, 187, 252) legislation (Nachbesserungspflicht, Korrekturpflicht, Anpassungspflicht, Verbesserungspflicht) , 15 which it usually words as follows: the legislator shall observe and, where necessary, correct the legislation. 16 Based on this case law, the obligation of correction supposes prior monitoring. However, doctrine is divided on the matter of whether the obligation of monitoring is a prerequisite to correction or whether it is an optional step, as these requirements are not always tied in case law. 17 The decisive element remains the obligation of correction that falls to the legislator at all times. Prior monitoring of the effects of executing legislation is at the very least indirectly required as it helps determine the exact moment at which the legislation must be corrected.
The legislator is not required to make the correction immediately. Legislative procedure takes time. Requiring an accelerated process would be unrealistic, according to doctrine.
18 It can be deduced from case law that the correction must occur as soon as possible: it is up to the legislator to remedy the unconstitutionality of the legislation 'sobald als möglich.'
19 Since the legislator is given a certain period of time to observe the effects of its texts, as we have shown, in principle it is not required to correct the legislation before that time is up. Correction is only required when the unconstitutionality is recognised or is clearly recognisable. 20 As it is a complex matter to determine just when this is, the legislator is given additional leeway in initiating its corrective action.
15
The Federal Constitutional Court uses these various terms without much differentiation (criticism: CHOI (n 2) 79ff) 16 '…muss der Gesetzgeber aber die weitere Entwicklung beobachten und gegebenenfalls eine Nachbesserung der Regelung vornehmen' (BVerfGE 95, 267, 314) . See also BVerfGE 111, 333, 360; 25, 1, 13; 49, 89, 130; 50, 290, 335; 57, 139, [162] [163] This case law obligation raises the delicate matter of determining the point at which the legislation is considered in breach of the Constitution. If judges need only factor in the situation at the time when the legislation is created, as the Court has allowed in certain rulings, 27 the legislation cannot become unconstitutional in the future. 28 The Court, in its case law on the monitoring and correction obligation, explicitly states that a law may originally be consistent with the Constitution, only to become contrary thereto as the relevant circumstances evolve. 29 The constitutional basis is found in article 20 of the German Constitution (GG) 30 'legislation is subject to the constitutional order; the executive and the judiciary are bound by law and justice.' 31 According to the Court, the legislator's subjection to the constitutional order (art. 20 par. 3 GG) extends beyond the obligation to respect the constitutional limits when legislation is adopted to encompass the responsibility of ensuring that enacted laws remain constitutional. 32 3.2 Where a situation of fact changes or is uncertain
The monitoring and correction obligation is likely to arise in two situations: when a law, which was constitutional when it was adopted, has become unconstitutional due to a subsequent fundamental change in the situation of fact or in the context of an uncertain situation of fact, based on assumptions that were plausible when the legislation was adopted but that turned out to be incorrect. 33 Thus, where it is later found that legislation is based on incorrect suppositions or where the facts change or new facts come to light, resulting in a violation of the Constitution, the obligation to correct the legislation is triggered.
The significant casuistry of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany illustrates the breadth of the fields affected by case law.
In penal law, as regards the sentencing of young offenders for example, assumptions are debatable. To reflect reality as closely as possible, the legislator must study experiences to date in order to draw on their lessons. It must collect reliable, comparable data that can be used to determine successes and failures, in particular the frequency of repeat offences.
34 Consideration was also given to the psychological and physical consequences of life sentences for murder. 35 As part of penal studies involving the use of geolocation systems (GPS) combined with video surveillance measures, the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe asked the legislator to 31 Based on the translation of the German Constitution published on the federal government's website (www. BVerfGE 45, 187, 252, Lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe, 21.06.1977 observe whether current procedural provisions will always be able to safeguard fundamental rights given uncertainties as to future innovations in technology. 36 Since very little is known about the effects of cannabis use, the Federal Constitutional Court asked the legislator to observe the impacts of the current legislative solution as well as to examine the experience in other countries. 37 The scientifically, politically and legally controversial matter of pregnancy termination II was to determine whether abortion counselling regulations for early pregnancies would better protect unborn lives than the regulations that had existed until then. Yet this uncertainty is no impediment to Parliament's introduction of a new concept in this regard; the legislator is simply required to take the precaution of observing its effects.
38
Environmental protection law is another fertile ground for this issue. In the area of noise control, skyrocketing air traffic levels since the early 1960s and the use of noisy jet aircraft warrant a review of original noise provisions. 39 In the field of atomic energy, the Court in Karlsruhe, in a groundbreaking decision, specified regarding authorisation to operate a breeder reactor in Kalkar, North Rhine-Westphalia, near the Dutch border, that 'where there are no past concrete situations, the evaluation [of the likelihood of future damage from operation of a nuclear facility] will have to be based on simulations. To the extent that there is no certainty but only approximations in this area, any new event or new knowledge will have to be considered as it arises.' 40 Economic forecasting is also a typical contingency area. In the old debts affair regarding the repayment of loans made to farming co-operatives in the former (BVerfGE 90, 145, 194, Cannabis, 09.03.1994) (Beobachtungs-und Nachbesserungspflicht) . ' (BVerfGE 88, 203, 269, Schwangerschaftsabbruch II, 28.05.1993 German Democratic Republic, the uncertainty concerned the efficacy of measures for a sound balance sheet. 41 Legislation on the participation of employee representatives conflicted with the question of the uncertain effects of these new measures and was subjected to a monitoring and correction obligation in the event of significant complications. 42 Older economic laws had previously drawn attention to this issue. Hence the assumptions on economic developments with respect to legislation prohibiting the expansion of the milling industry. 43 This case law also covers the appropriateness of taxation assumptions, in this case the constitutionality of collecting and allocating a compensation tax under legislation governing severely disabled persons 44 or that respecting the disputed tax on the transportation of goods for a company's own use. 45 Although a new political contribution system does not impede equal opportunity, the legislator is still bound to verify the accuracy of its estimates regarding the legislation's impacts, collecting the necessary statistical data, and correcting the set percentage where necessary. 46 to base assumptions does not constitute grounds for judging the outcome of a litigious situation. This was the case with a new concept for local radio, where it was premature to assume, when the legislation was adopted, that it would not work or would threaten the economic survival of local radio.
'Angesichts der dargestellten offenen kriminalpolitischen und wissenschaftlichen Diskussion über die vom Cannabiskonsum ausgehenden Gefahren und den richtigen Weg ihrer Bekämpfung […] hat der Gesetzgeber die Auswirkungen des geltenden Rechts unter Einschluß der Erfahrungen des Auslandes zu beobachten und zu überprüfen'

'Wissenschaftlich und rechtspolitisch umstritten war und ist allerdings, ob eine Beratungsregelung für Schwangerschaftsabbrüche in der Frühphase der Schwangerschaft eine bessere Schutzwirkung für das ungeborene Leben entfalten kann als die bisherige Regelung. […] Angesichts der dargelegten Gründe, die gegen die Beibehaltung der bisherigen Indikationenregelung sprechen, hindern solche Ungewißheiten den Gesetzgeber jedoch nicht grundsätzlich daran, eine Beratungsregelung einzuführen; freilich ist er gehalten, die Auswirkungen seines neuen Schutzkonzepts im Auge zu behalten
47
The academic milieu has also led to case law. The use of inadequate evaluation criteria when judging the quality of academic education and research jeopardises the freedom of science, as science assessment practices are a work in progress. The Court requires that the legislator observe this evolution and correct legislation as soon as a threat to freedoms materialises. 48 The matter had been addressed before in relation to a framework law instituting a numerus clausus. 49 Finally, the Court gave a verdict on a range of topics involving a similar issue. In the zootechnical field, although current scientific knowledge has yet to draw a direct link between a dog's dangerousness and its breed, 50 the legislator has room for discretion in its assumptions. After all, unless the legislator had formed a final opinion on the factual data and the impacts of regulations when they were adopted, it is obligated to track the evolving effects and revise the legislation when necessary.
51
Alternative population census techniques were still considered unreliable at the time of the Court ruling; as advances are continually being made in statistical and social science methods, the legislator must observe their development and determine on a timely basis whether these new approaches are valid alternatives to the full census, by taking into account the principle of proportionality. ' (BVerfGE 110, 141, 158) methods were found to threaten the freedom to vote or the secrecy of the ballot, the legislator would be required to make the necessary corrections. 
Penalties
The obligation to correct legislation is a true legal obligation that is binding upon the legislator. 54 Its obligatory nature is clearly a product of the formulas used by the Federal Constitutional Court, but must nevertheless be relativised. 55 The question continues to be debated in doctrine. 56 For example, the obligation has always been set out in the reasons for judgment but never in the pronouncement.
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The judicial control, however, is scarce, and the obligation to correct legislation remains largely under-enforced 58 .
Politically, there have been Parliamentary requests to revise current legislation on the basis of this obligation. This was the case when a Parliamentary faction opposed to abortion asked the government whether the legislator's monitoring and correction duty was being respected 59 in relation to a new counselling system for women who wish to terminate their pregnancy in the first trimester.
60 The government's response was to point out that a statistical mechanism had been introduced and that there was no need to correct the legislation. ' (BVerfGE 65, 1, 55-56, Volkszählung, 15.12.1983) ' (BVerfGE 59, 119, 127, Briefwahl, 24.11.1981) 54 MAYER (n 2) 38-39 55 ibid 39-40 56 Failure to comply with the obligation to monitor laws would not be penalised (CHOI (n 2) 78 and ref. cit.) whereas failure to comply with the obligation to correct laws should be analyzed based on the outcome of the judgment (constitutionality) (CHOI (n 2) 176-177) 
Case law established by the Federal Supreme Court
The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland borrowed this concept without an explicit reference to German law in deciding whether the Federal Council's Ordinance on Protection from Non-ionising Radiation, on December 23, 1999, (ORNI) 62 complied with federal law by charging the government with an obligation to monitor, evaluate and correct this text due to uncertainty regarding scientific knowledge on the biological effects of non-ionising radiation from mobile telephony towers. 63 The Federal Supreme Court deemed that the Federal Council (federal government) would have to review the threshold values in the ordinance when new objective and reliable scientific knowledge on the biological effects of non-ionising radiation became available and threw out claims that the supporting expert reports did not show the existence of such knowledge. According to the Federal Supreme Court, 64 the government has a great deal of latitude in this evaluation. In practice, this obligation is enforced by the various stakeholders that periodically raise this grievance by presenting the judge with new scientific expertise. To date the Federal Supreme Court has always concluded that the Federal Council has fulfilled its obligation to regularly reassess the facts. 65 Although the Federal Supreme Court did not state so explicitly, this obligation can also be based on articles 170 Cst. and 44 par. 1 of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Environment (Environmental Protection Act, or EPA), 66 stipulating that the efficacy of the Confederation's measures must be evaluated.
Recently, without reference to the previous judgment but citing German case law, the Federal Supreme Court, in a ruling on an appeal of the proportionality of requiring authorisation to own potentially dangerous dogs, cast doubt on the efficacy of the disputed regulations.
67 Nevertheless, the Court accepted that this urgent measure to protect the public was not arbitrary, but specified that the current 62 validity of such data, in order to prioritise application of the principle defined in article 32a par. 1 EPA'.
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5.
Relationship to the precautionary principle
The case law obligation of legislative monitoring and correction can be discussed from the perspective of the precautionary principle. 73 In the Swiss example of electromagnetic radiation, the values adopted are those of international recommendations which do not account for unproven biological effects. The Federal Council, in a report explaining the draft ordinance on protection against non-ionising radiation, acknowledges this shortcoming, clearly stating that protection against undesirable effects is not entirely guaranteed by the ordinance even when the threshold values for immission are respected, precisely because these values were set without factoring in effects that cannot be scientifically proven. 74 The Federal Supreme Court agreed to this approach on the grounds that such effects can be considered by limiting emissions preventively within the meaning of article 11 par. 2 EPA. 75 The case law of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany was also analyzed from this angle, particularly the decision on the Kalkar breeder reactor.
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As such, uncertain scientific knowledge regarding a given activity is not a condemnation to prohibition. Contrary to common belief, applying the precautionary principle does not always translate to prohibitive measures. 77 Even so, being subject to the obligation of correction does not automatically give free rein to the activity, as it is now overshadowed by a monitoring and analysis framework that may require reassessment of the legislative solution, which is no longer guaranteed The problem is likely semantic in nature. Some believe that formal measures (e.g., observation, technological monitoring, evaluation) are not precautionary measures. Only measures limiting actual exercise of the litigious activity would be precautionary in their view. This conception must be nuanced: formal measures are indeed precautionary, but at the lower end of the spectrum. Not requiring such measures when there is reasonable doubt would show a complete lack of caution. In any case, such actions constitute measures taken in application of the precautionary principle, for anyone who would oppose the use of the term precautionary measure (FLÜCKIGER, 'La preuve juridique à l'épreuve du principe de précaution' (n 73) 122) once and for all. Practically speaking, the difficulty lies in the degree of uncertainty concerning the effects of the contested measures. Should the legislator have the right, despite this uncertainty, to adopt a legislative solution with uncertain impacts, with the prospect of subsequently repealing it should the desired outcomes fail to materialise? The answer is found in the interpretation of the principle of proportionality (art. 5 par. 2 Cst.). The principle's criterion of aptitude does not require that the measure's efficacy be duly proven and free of uncertainty. Under Germany's Kalkar decision, the Court in Karlsruhe deemed that demanding the legislator enact regulations absolutely free of any danger in order to guarantee fundamental rights would mean underestimating human intelligence and would virtually ban the State from authorising use of the technique. 78 In general, it suffices that efficacy is not ruled out entirely, that it is indeed possible, if not probable. Thus, when evaluating aptitude depends on controversial technical knowledge or on assumptions, the Federal Supreme Court only concludes that the principle of proportionality has been breached when that breach is obvious. 79 In cases involving greater uncertainty, authorising the activity subject to a concomitant evaluation as a basis for re-examining the solution (monitoring and correction obligation) is a concrete application of proportionality, as it eliminates the need for more incisive measures, like a moratorium or a straight-out prohibition. 80 The monitoring and correction obligation, however, should only apply once there is a given level of uncertainty. A minimum threshold of reasonable doubt must exist (minimum level of scientificity), 81 otherwise the risk of arbitrariness (art. 9 Cst.) arises. If unreasonable fears were to trigger application of the precautionary principle, fundamental rights would be in jeopardy. 
Conclusion
When a situation of fact is uncertain, random or unpredictable, a judge may impose the obligation to observe a law's effects, assess its impacts and make any necessary corrections based on findings as a precaution to prevent a violation of fundamental rights, provided there is at least a degree of reasonable doubt. This is an application of the principle of proportionality. in such circumstances would otherwise be highly artificial. Scientific uncertainty cannot suddenly be transformed into pseudo-certainty through juridification. In this context, the law undergoes a maturation process. It adapts to a changing environment, no longer claiming to provide a permanent solution. The legislator's duty no longer ends when a law is enacted-rather, enactment becomes a prelude.
